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Abstract 
In recent years, institutional investors have developed rapidly, and 
have gradually developed into a trend of growing multi-type institutional 
investors. Management compensation system, as an important part of 
corporate governance, is a system that institutional investors often pay 
attention to. And the performance sensitivity to management compensation 
can precisely measure the improvement of corporate governance of corporate 
investors, showing the convergence of management and shareholders’ goals. 
Therefore, it is meaningful to discuss the relation between institutional 
investor's shareholding and company management compensation-
performance sensitivity. This paper combines normative research and 
empirical research, combs and summarizes domestic and foreign literature, 
and puts forward some research hypotheses. In terms of empirical research, 
this paper selects Chinese listed companies as research samples to study the 
influence of overall institutional investors and different types of institutional 
investors on the performance sensitivity to listed companies' management 
compensation. There is a positive correlation between the overall institutional 
investor's shareholding and performance sensitivity to management 
compensation. Compared with trading institutional investors, stable 
institutional investors are more able to increase the performance sensitivity to 
management compensation in Chinese listed companies.  
Keywords: Institutional investors, management compensation, performance 
sensitivity, corporate governance 
 
1.  Introduction 
In modern joint-stock enterprises, under normal circumstances, the 
owner of the company will hire a professional manager from outside to take 
charge of the daily operation and management of the company in order to 
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achieve better operating results. But in this case, it will inevitably bring about 
the separation of ownership and management rights, which will lead to a series 
of agency problems such as information asymmetry and principal-agent 
conflicts. Enterprises generally adopt two methods to solve the above 
problems, one is to motivate management, and the other is to strengthen the 
daily supervision of management by shareholders themselves. However, there 
are few shareholders who are both independent and have strong supervisory 
capabilities. Institutional investors have long played a leading role in Western 
markets. Since the 1980s, the shareholding structure of listed companies has 
gradually developed from a decentralized trend to a centralized trend, and has 
gradually occupied a certain share in the market. Data show that in the short 
period of thirty years of the development of capital markets in Western 
countries, the proportion of institutional investors has increased from 30% to 
70%, and they have become the backbone of the market. As their 
shareholdings continue to increase, they participate in corporate governance 
more actively. They began to engage in corporate governance through private 
consultations and holding shareholders’ meetings. Among them, the 
company's management compensation system is an important exhibition of 
corporate governance policy. Institutional investors can constrain 
management by participating in and supervising the company's management 
compensation system, thereby better exerting the effectiveness of corporate 
governance. 
Compared with developed countries in Europe and the United States, 
the growth rate of institutional investors in China is relatively slow. With the 
improvement of the environment and institutional system of Chinese capital 
market, institutional investors have more advantages than individual investors 
in terms of professional knowledge and funds, so they can better play the 
monitoring role of shareholders, actively participate and gradually improve 
corporate governance. The pace of growth of institutional investors in China 
is constantly accelerating and gradually forming a new pattern. After referring 
to the relevant conclusions of foreign scholars and considering the actual 
situation of the country's current economy, it is not difficult to see that 
institutional investors should actively participate in corporate governance. The 
performance sensitivity to management compensation can effectively measure 
whether management is working hard, and it will certainly be valued by 
shareholders. Against the background of the lack of external control of the 
domestic securities market and the special ownership structure, whether 
institutional investors are intensifying their development of corporate 
governance, especially performance sensitivity to management compensation 
of listed company? Whether different types of institutional investors have 
different impact on them? These issues are worth exploring. 
After more than 20 years of development, Chinese institutional 
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investors continue to go deep into corporate governance. To a certain degree 
they have formed a binding force on invested companies. From the perspective 
of management compensation-performance sensitivity, this article combines 
theoretical analysis and empirical research methods to explore whether 
Chinese institutional investors can play the role of corporate governance, 
which has certain theoretical and practical significance in Chinese special 
institutional background. As for theoretical significance of this article, on the 
one hand, it expands the research of Chinese institutional investors in 
corporate governance. On the other hand, it improves the domestic research 
on the performance sensitivity to corporate management compensation. 
Regarding the effectiveness of institutional investors in corporate governance, 
most domestic scholars have studied from the perspective of corporate 
ownership structure, earnings management, performance, etc. The literature 
from the perspective of institutional investor heterogeneity has also been 
studied. In addition, although there have been related studies abroad, based on 
the special market characteristics of our country, foreign studies ’results are 
only for reference and cannot explain Chinese market characteristics. So it is 
necessary to discuss the role of institutional investors in conjunction with 
Chinese special market conditions. China not only has to alleviate the conflicts 
that have always existed between the majority controlling shareholders and 
corporate management, but also needs to deal with the difficulties that exist 
between the controlling shareholders and the small and medium shareholders. 
Therefore, this paper has two theoretical significances: one is to broaden the 
research of institutional investors on corporate governance at a certain level; 
the other is to resolve the above-mentioned contradictions from a completely 
new perspective, strengthen the monitoring of institutional investors on 
corporate governance, which restrict controlling shareholders’ rights of 
seizing private benefits, thereby promoting the vigorous growth of Chinese 
capital market. The significance of this article on the practical application level 
is to take actual situation of Chinese development as the starting point, and 
provide practical instructions for institutional investors to actively participate 
in corporate governance. Chinese institutional investors are constantly 
developing and their participation in corporate governance is gradually 
deepening. Although some scholars have shown that institutional investors can 
promote improvement of corporate governance mechanism, there are still 
some historical problems in China as a developing country. Nowadays, the 
phenomenon of speculation still occurs seriously in capital market, so it needs 
to be analyzed in accordance with the special market circumstances of the 
country. As an important part of Chinese listed companies, state-owned 
enterprises have their particularities in terms of governance structure and 
compensation system. Ownership concentration is relatively high. As Chinese 
main controlling shareholder, the government restricts the compensation of 
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senior managements of state-owned enterprises. These phenomena indicate 
that there are still many areas for improvement in corporate governance. 
Therefore, the topic of whether institutional investors can promote corporate 
governance requires more studies and analysis. 
This article mainly analyzes the relationship between institutional 
investor and management compensation-performance sensitivity. After 
collating the current research results of scholars, we put forward some 
hypothesis and verified it. This article mainly uses a combination of normative 
research and empirical analysis to analyze the relationship between the 
institutional investor and the performance sensitivity to management 
compensation in listed companies. The innovations of this paper are as 
follows: (1) it enriches the research on the correlation between institutional 
investors and the performance sensitivity to management compensation. 
Among the current articles on institutional investors’ participation in corporate 
governance in China, most of them are discussed from the perspectives of 
institutional investor and management compensation and corporate 
performance. There are relatively few articles that use the performance 
sensitivity to management compensation as the research perspective. 
Therefore, referring to previous studies, the article discusses the above 
relationship, and then explores from the perspective of overall institutional 
investors and the heterogeneity of institutional investors, thereby 
complementing the research results in this area. (2) The article distinguishes 
between different types of institutional investors, and studies how different 
investment behaviors of institutional investors affect the performance 
sensitivity to management compensation. At present, domestic discussions 
about the performance sensitivity to institutional investors and management 
compensation are mainly studied from the perspective of the overall 
shareholding ratio, and few scholars have classified institutional investors into 
categories. This paper draws on the practices of Niu Jianbo (2013) and 
classifies institutional investors into stable and trading types based on 
investment behavior. It explores the impact of institutional investors and their 
heterogeneity on management compensation-performance sensitivity in listed 
companies from a new perspective.  
 
2.  Literature review 
As capital market is developing, institutional investors are also 
developing and their participation in corporate governance and management 
activities is deepening. As an important part of institutional investors' 
participation in corporate governance, the compensation system of managers 
will surely attract the attention of shareholders. In general, institutional 
investors can use different methods to participate in the design of management 
compensation systems in enterprises to improve the compensation 
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mechanism. Many scholars have analyzed the relationship between 
institutional investors and management compensation from different aspects. 
 
2.1.  Correlation between institutional investors and management  
compensation 
Useem (1990) found that in the enterprise, when the institutional 
investor's shareholding is relatively high, it will suppress the excessive 
compensation level of the managements and keep it within a reasonable or 
even lower range. Andres (2005), Ozkan (2007), etc. also reached similar 
conclusions. These scholars believe that with the increase of the institutional 
investors’ shareholding ratio, their participation in corporate governance and 
management has gradually deepened, and in the process of actively 
participating in corporate governance, it will help alleviate the problem of 
excessive corporate agency costs, thereby improving management 
compensation to some extent. However, it is worth noting that some foreign 
researchers have reached conclusions that are completely different from the 
above analysis. Clay (2000) analyzed the data of listed companies in the 
United States from 1991 to 1997 and found that the shareholding ratio of 
institutional investors was significantly positively related to management 
compensation. Feng and Ghosh (2010) and others also reached the same 
conclusion that as institutional investors' shareholding ratio rises, management 
compensation will also increase significantly. The main reason is that 
corporate management's risk will gradually increase with the deepening of 
institutional investors' participation in corporate governance. In view of this, 
management generally requires companies to pay more as additional 
compensation for their risks. 
On the basis of referring to some foreign literatures, most domestic 
scholars have proved through analysis that there is a clear relationship between 
institutional investment and shareholdings and the compensation level of 
enterprise management. Chen Yanyan (2006) used the data of listed 
companies in the manufacturing industry in China in 2004 as a research 
sample. After empirical research, it was found that the effect of the 
institutional investors’ shareholding ratio on management compensation level 
will change with time. For a short period of time, management compensation 
will increase with the gradual increase in the shareholding ratio of institutional 
investors. But from a long-term perspective, institutional investors have not 
significantly improved the level of management compensation. After analysis, 
Li Yingzhao and Wang Hui (2011) found that the shareholding ratio of 
institutional investors has significantly improved management compensation, 
and it can also improve corporate governance and management. The reason is 
that in order to meet standards and expectations by institutional investors, 
managers have to devote more effort to improving the company's operating 
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conditions. So companies have to pay higher wages to make up for the efforts 
of senior management. Zhang Chi (2013) analyzed the data of listed 
companies in China from 2004 to 2010 and concluded that institutional 
investors will make the corporate governance mechanism more reasonable, 
and thus promote the compensation mechanism more in line with the efforts 
and performance of management. After empirical research, Liu Yuan and Sun 
Hongmei (2013) also concluded that the higher the institutional investor's 
shareholding ratio, the higher the management compensation will be. 
In addition to discussing the correlation between the overall 
shareholding of institutional investors and management compensation, 
scholars have also studied the relationship between heterogeneity and 
management compensation. Shin (2005) found that the length of time of 
institutional investors’ shareholding affects its relationship with management 
compensation. The reason is that as institutional investors' shareholding time 
elapses, their exit costs will increase significantly. Institutional investors will 
have to strengthen management supervision to avoid paying high exit costs. 
Participation in the compensation system is an important method set to 
strengthen effective supervision. Borokhovich (2006) and Cornett et al. (2007) 
classify institutional investors with reference to the early Brickley (1988) and 
other methods. Based on the potential business relationships between 
institutional investors and their investment companies, they are divided into 
pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant types. Pressure-sensitive institutional 
investor and the invested company have strong commercial relevance, so 
institutional investors often cannot make relatively independent decisions, and 
the pressure-resistant type is just the opposite of the above situation. After 
classification, it was found that institutional investors of pressure-resistant 
type can significantly affect corporate compensation level, while Pressure-
sensitive institutional investors have not played a relevant role. The main 
reason is that there are not too many commercial interests involved in 
pressure-resistant institutional investors and holding companies, so 
professional judgment can be made when engaging in corporate supervision 
without interference from the invested companies. 
Similarly, some domestic scholars have studied the role of different 
types of institutional investors on management compensation level from the 
perspective of institutional investors’ heterogeneity. Yi Zhihong, Gao Wei 
(2010) used the classification methods of Brikly (1988), etc., and the 
conclusions obtained through empirical research are consistent with foreign 
scholars. Compared with pressure-sensitive institutional investors, only 
pressure-resistant institutional investors can have a significant impact on the 
level of management's compensation. At the same time, such institutional 
investors are conducive to the design of management's compensation 
mechanism to develop in a more rational direction. Zhenhai (2011) used the 
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shareholding period as the classification standard, and divided institutional 
investors into two categories: long-term and short-term. Through specific 
analysis, they concluded that the longer the holding period of institutional 
investors, the higher corporate management's compensation level. Wang 
Zongjun, Mao Lei, and Wang Lingling (2011) analyzed the listed companies 
in China and found that, as a whole, the increase in the institutional investor's 
shareholding is conducive to the improvement of management compensation 
level. But if it is classified according to the organizational form，the types of 
institutional investors' influence of different types on management 
compensation vary greatly, and only institutional investors of funds type can 
have a significant impact on the level of management compensation. Wenwen 
Wang (2012) reached the same conclusion through empirical research. 
 
2.2  Correlation between Institutional Investors' Shareholding and 
Performance Sensitivity to Management Compensation  
Due to different corporate governance frameworks domestically and 
abroad, or for different reasons for analysis, domestic and foreign articles have 
not reached a relatively consistent conclusion on the relationship between 
institutional investors and the performance sensitivity to management 
compensation. Cosh and Hughes (1997) based on a large amount of data. After 
analysis, it was found that institutional investors could not significantly 
improve the performance sensitivity to management compensation in listed 
companies. In China, Li Shanmin and Wang Caiping (2007) used the data of 
listed companies in China from 2000 to 2003 as a sample and took the salary 
contract as the theoretical analysis basis for their research. They found that 
institutional investors could not significantly improve performance sensitivity 
to management compensation. Li Chao, Cai Qingfeng, Chen Jiao et al. (2012) 
also reached similar conclusions through empirical research. They found that 
institutional investors in China could not effectively restrict the management's 
equity incentives and the growth of fixed compensation. Because the existence 
of agency costs made them Lack of initiative to participate in the establishment 
of the compensation system, accordingly institutional investors will not be 
able to improve managements' equity incentives and compensation design. 
With the increasing shareholding of institutional investors, their 
participation in the design and implementation of management compensation 
systems has gradually deepened. More and more articles have proved that 
institutional investors were significantly upgrading their effect on 
performance sensitivity to management compensation. Based on listed 
companies in the United States from 1992 to 1997, Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
found that with the increase of institutional investors' ownership 
concentration, the performance sensitivity to management compensation in 
invested companies will also increase accordingly. Almazan (2005), after 
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classifying institutional investors as potentially positive and potentially 
negative, concluded that the increase in the shareholding ratio of the former 
can significantly improve the performance sensitivity to corporate 
managements' compensation, but the latter has not reached the conclusion of 
institutional investors’ role. Feng (2010) and others analyzed the impact of 
real estate investment trust funds on the management compensation of listed 
companies from 1998 to 2007 and found that institutional investors can 
significantly promote the performance sensitivity to management 
compensation. 
Chinese research on the relationship between institutional investors 
and the performance sensitivity to management compensation started 
relatively late, but has also accumulated some significant results. Zhang Min 
and Jiang Fuxiu (2010) divided the enterprises into state-owned and non-state-
owned, and then studied the correlation between institutional investors and the 
performance sensitivity to management compensation in different types of 
enterprises. The performance sensitivity to management compensation has 
increased significantly, but institutional investors have not played a similar 
role in state-owned holding companies. Yi Zhihong, Li Yanli (2011), etc. 
based on the marketization process, and refer to the classification method of 
Brickley (1988) to classify institutional investors into pressure-resistant and 
pressure-sensitive. The study concluded that all institutional investors can 
significantly improve the performance sensitivity to management 
compensation, and the speed of the marketization process will have different 
impacts on this effect. Wang Hui (2012) came to a similar conclusion after 
performing the same classification. Because pressure-resistant institutional 
investors do not have too much interest in business with the holding company, 
they actively engage in corporate governance and effectively increase the 
performance sensitivity to management compensation. According to certain 
criteria Mao Lei, Wang Zongjun (2011), etc. screened the data of 847 listed 
companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2005 to 2009 in China as analysis 
samples, and divided them into funds, comprehensive brokers, and qualified 
overseas investments based on the organizational structure. There are a total 
of six categories of investors, social security funds, insurance companies, and 
trust companies. Through empirical research, it is found that overall 
institutional investors are conducive to improving the performance sensitivity 
to corporate managements' compensation. In specific categories, only funds 
can significantly improve the above indicators, while the other five categories 
of institutional investors have not shown the same governance effect. 
 
2.3  Literature review 
Regarding the relationship between institutional investors and 
management compensation, foreign articles do not hold a relatively unified 
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view. From the perspective of agency costs, some scholars hold the view that 
institutional investors can reduce management compensation because 
corporate performance after participating in corporate governance shows a 
significant improvement effect, which is conducive to the implementation of 
the goal of maximizing corporate value, thereby reducing agency Costs and 
management compensation have also fallen accordingly. But some scholars 
hold opposite opinions after analysis. The reason is that from the perspective 
of risk-benefit, the strengthening of institutional investors' supervision of the 
invested company will lead to increased risks faced by managements. 
Therefore, management generally requires companies to pay more salaries as 
an additional burden for them to bear higher risks.  
In China, the development history of institutional investors is relatively 
short, and there are relatively few studies on the above relations. Only a few 
scholars have concluded that institutional investors can effectively improve 
management compensation. The main reason for the inconsistency of research 
results domestically and abroad is that scholars have different definitions and 
classification methods for institutional investors. Various types of institutional 
investors have different investment goals, styles, and methods, etc., and the 
impact on management compensation is very different. Therefore, if the 
institutional investors can be comprehensively and systematically classified, 
the results will be more convincing. . Summarizing relevant literature 
domestically and abroad, most scholars believe that institutional investors who 
hold shares for a long time and actively participate in corporate governance 
can generally play a role in increasing compensation of senior managements. 
For institutional investors, it is more difficult to significantly improve the 
management compensation level. Because there are few related domestic 
researches, and most of the classifications of institutional investors are based 
on the methods of foreign literature, a systematic analysis and summary of 
previous research is needed. 
Earlier in the world, some scholars obtained the result that institutional 
investors have no significant correlation with the performance sensitivity to 
management compensation through data analysis. However, as the size of 
institutional investors has gradually grown, more and more scholars have 
taken empirical analysis. It is concluded that the overall institutional investors 
can significantly affect the level of management compensation, and that there 
are differences in the impact of different types of institutional investors on the 
performance sensitivity to management compensation. In China, scholars 
generally analyze the role played by institutional investors in corporate 
governance from the perspective of ownership structure, earnings 
management, and management compensation. Few scholars use the 
performance sensitivity to management compensation as the research 
perspective. Performance sensitivity to management compensation is an 
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important indicator for measuring the efforts of managements of listed 
companies. This indicator can show the positive role of institutional investors 
in corporate governance. At the same time, domestic literature generally 
distinguishes the heterogeneity of institutional investors from a qualitative 
perspective. There is no specific analysis of the institutional investors of listed 
companies. The classification methods are relatively general and cannot show 
the role played by institutional investors.  
 
3.  Hypothesis development 
As institutional investors continue to increase their shareholdings, their 
effectiveness in corporate governance is gradually increasing. The main 
reasons why institutional investors can play an effective role are as follows: 
First, institutional investors have stronger professional capabilities than 
private investors. They can obtain important information from multiple 
channels. The strategies and methods used in investment operations are also 
more effective. They exert scientific and rational investments, and at the same 
time pay more attention to risks management. Institutional investors have a 
stronger supervision of the invested company, thereby reducing the probability 
of speculative behavior. Second, as institutional investors continue to increase 
their holdings in invested companies; institutional investors have changed 
from simple price takers to one of the factors affecting stock price volatility. 
In this case, if institutional investors still devote themselves to corporate 
governance in the form of "free-rider", then the company's stock price can 
easily fall significantly, and the losses suffered by institutional investors will 
deepen. Therefore, in order to ensure that their own interests are not harmed, 
they generally implement strong supervision. Third, there is a scale effect on 
the benefits of institutional investors and the cost of supervision. When 
institutional investors’ shareholding ratio is increased, the average regulatory 
cost will decrease, so that institutional investors can gain an advantage in cost-
benefit tradeoff. Some scholars have found through research that when the 
institutional investor's shareholding ratio is increased to a certain degree, the 
benefits they receive are sufficient to cover their costs, and the growth rate of 
the benefits is considerable. The main way to effectively alleviate the 
principal-agent problem is to encourage management and shareholders to 
strengthen their own supervision. As one of the main controlling shareholders, 
institutional investors will inevitably adopt the method of intervening 
remuneration to motivate the management in order to improve corporate 
performance. Kubo (2012) analysis found that the performance sensitivity to 
management compensation can determine the amount of managements’ effort 
in listed companies. Based on this, this article proposes the first hypothesis: 
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H1: The overall shareholding of institutional investors is positively related to 
the performance sensitivity to management compensation. 
With the rapid development of institutional investors, various types of 
institutions have shown significant differences in the size and source of funds, 
management styles, and the formulation of compensation mechanisms has also 
shown greater differences. Brickley (1988) and others divided institutional 
investors into " pressure-sensitive" and "pressure-resistant" according to the 
different goals, management styles, and risk resistance capabilities of 
institutional investors. The impact of institutional investors on performance 
sensitivity to management compensation varies widely. Tang Yuejun (2010) 
and Mao Lei (2012) subdivided institutional investors according to their 
organizational structure, specifically funds, securities firms, insurance 
companies, social security funds, QFII, and other types of institutional 
investors. After further research and analyses, it is found that the impact of 
these six types of institutional investors on the performance sensitivity to 
management compensation is very different. From this, it can be seen that if 
only the institutional investors are considered as a whole to discuss their role 
in the performance sensitivity to management compensation, it is likely to 
cause conclusions to be biased. 
The above analysis of institutional investors is mainly from the 
perspective of their shareholding ratio. However, it is worth noting that the 
indicator of shareholding ratio cannot fully show the increase or decrease of 
the performance sensitivity of institutional investors to management 
compensation. Because this indicator does not include other factors other than 
shareholding level in its reference to the impact on the performance sensitivity, 
such as investment duration and turnover rate. The enthusiasm of institutional 
investors for supervision of corporate management will fluctuate depending 
on the investor's investment objectives. Some institutional investors will 
monitor corporate daily operations and management with a positive outlook. 
Other institutional investors are only concerned about how much profit the 
company can make in a short period of time and the fluctuations in stock 
prices. The main factor that determines the strength of institutional investors' 
supervision and whether to implement trading strategies within a short period 
of time is the stability of institutional investors. On the one hand, relatively 
stable institutional investors have a higher shareholding ratio during a specific 
investment period, and have more opportunities and capabilities to carefully 
analyze holding companies, which can prevent or reduce the occurrence of 
behaviors that harm shareholders' interests in advance. On the other hand, as 
the investment period of institutional investors continues to increase, the exit 
cost of investment is getting higher and the cost of management and 
supervision is getting lower. It can be inferred that institutional investors 
generally will participate in corporate governance more actively. Institutional 
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investors will step up efforts to supervise corporate management, which has 
promoted the performance sensitivity to management compensation. 
Compared with stable institutional investors, trading institutional investors 
have a strong tendency to trade stocks, and they are pinning their hopes to 
increase returns through multiple trading strategies. From this, it can be 
inferred that stable institutional investors belong to effective supervisors of 
enterprises, while trading institutional investors belong to ineffective 
supervisors. 
From the definition of institutional investor stability by Niu Jianbo 
(2013), it can be seen that the share of stable institutional investors is high and 
stable, and the share of trading institutional investors is low and fluctuates 
frequently. Therefore, compared with trading institutional investors, stable 
institutional investors have a stronger willingness to monitor the daily 
behavior of managers, and have greater opportunities to promote better 
corporate governance and increase the performance sensitivity to management 
compensation. 
Based on this, this article proposes a second hypothesis: 
H2: Compared with trading institutional investors, stable institutional 
investors impact more on performance sensitivity to management 
compensation. 
 
4.  Research design 
4.1  Data source and sample selection 
     This article uses the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies 
on the main board from the five years from 2014 to 2018 as the initial sample. 
In order to ensure the comprehensiveness of the data and the reliability of the 
research, this article screens the initial sample according to the following 
principles: 
1. According to the classification standards of the CSRC industry, the 
financial and insurance companies are excluded first. Financial and 
insurance companies have been removed due to their significant 
differences in financial treatment and accounting policies from general 
listed companies. 
2. Exclude listed companies with ST and * ST. This type of company is 
removed because it has abnormal financial conditions or is in a state 
of continuous loss, and its inclusion in the study may affect the results. 
3. Exclude listed companies that issue B shares and H shares at the same 
time. The main reason is that the securities environment of the B-share 
and H-share markets is quite different from the A-share market. 
Because this article mainly studies the A-share listed companies in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, for the purpose of research independence, it 
is not affected by other markets, so it is eliminated. 
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4. In order to ensure the comparability of the research, companies listed 
after 2012 are excluded. 
5. Exclude listed companies with missing data, incomplete data, errors or 
extreme values. For example, companies with negative management 
pay in the company's financial report or companies that did not 
disclose specific management income. 
6. In the end, companies were selected from the CSMAR and WIND 
databases according to the above criteria, and a total of 8387 samples 
were obtained.  
  
4.2  Dependent variables 
The dependent variable in this article is management compensation. In 
corporate annual report, listed companies will publicly disclose the top three 
managements' highest compensation. Because the research in this paper 
mainly involves the performance sensitivity performance to management 
compensation, referring to the practice of Xin Qingquan et al. (2009), the 
natural logarithm of the total compensation of the top three managements with 
the highest annual compensation in corporate annual financial report is taken 
as the dependent variable. Its symbol is indicated as LnPay. 
 
4.3  Explanatory variables 
When measuring the performance sensitivity to management 
compensation, this paper refers to the practice of Lu Rui (2011), and uses the 
correlation coefficient of corporate performance indicators to represent the 
performance sensitivity to management compensation. Therefore, there are 
two explanatory variables in this article, which are the company performance 
(Perf) and the institutional investor's shareholding ratio (Inst). 
 
1. Company performance (Perf). 
There are three main criteria for measuring the performance of listed 
companies. The first is based on accounting indicators, which intuitively 
reflects corporate profitability, operating level, management and other 
indicators, which generally include the rate of return on assets, price-earnings 
ratio, net Return on assets, earnings per share, etc. The second is based on 
market value; measured by economic value added, stock returns and other 
indicators. Through this indicator, shareholders can understand the level of the 
corporate operations. However, due to weak-effective Chinese securities 
market, the rationality of the system on the market is still not perfect. If market 
indicators are used, it cannot fully reflect actual corporate performance. The 
third is Tobin Q. Tobin Q is the ratio between a corporate market value and its 
asset replacement cost. However, in many cases, the replacement cost of 
corporate assets is difficult to obtain, and the required data and processes are 
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also complicated. 
To sum up, this article adopts the ROE adopted by most scholars as an 
indicator to measure corporate performance. There are two main reasons for 
this: First, the indicator is comprehensive and not only reflects the profitability 
of the enterprise, but also comprehensively reflects it corporate financing 
structure, capital operation, cost control and other information; second, the 
indicator can also reflect the corporate profitability and investment return of 
shareholders. Therefore, it is used as an index to evaluate corporate 
performance .At the same time the ROA is replaced by the ROA in the 
robustness test. 
 
2. Shareholding ratio of institutional investors (Install). 
The shareholding ratio of all institutional investors in the article is 
measured by the shareholding ratio of all institutional investors in the tradable 
A shares of listed companies. The shareholding ratios of different types of 
institutional investors are based on the six categories mentioned above. The 
shareholdings of classified institutions in the database show that the number 
of shares held by funds, securities dealers, social security funds, qualified 
foreign investors, insurance companies and trust companies in the A shares of 
listed companies is measured. 
 
3. Stable for institutional investors. 
With reference to the classification method of institutional investors 
by Niu Jianbo et al. (2013), institutional investors are classified into stable 
institutional investors and trading institutional investors based on investment 
industry and time. First we calculate the standard deviation of the institutional 
investor's shareholding ratio of enterprise i in the previous three years; Then 
we obtain the ratio of the standard deviation to the institutional investor's 
shareholding ratio for three years. The larger the ratio, the more stable the 
institutional investment; the dummy variable Stable is the standard for 
institutional investor stability. With a value of 1, it indicates that the 
institutional investor is stable, and it is a stable institutional investor in year t; 
otherwise, it is 0, indicating that the institutional investor of enterprise i in year 
t is trading corporate investor. 
Table 1. Variable definition 
 Variable Symbol Definition 
Dependent 
variables 
Management 
compensation 
Ln Pay The natural logarithm of the 
total compensation of the top 
three managements 
Explanatory  
variables 
Corporate 
performance 
Perf1 
 
Return on equity 
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Institutional 
investor 
shareholding 
InstAll The proportion of institutional 
investors’ holding shares at 
the end of the year  
Institutional 
investor holding 
stability 
 
Stable Dummy variable. When the 
value is 1, it represents a 
stable institutional investor; 
when the value is 0, it 
represents a trading 
institutional investor  
 Company size Size Natural logarithm of total 
assets at the end of the year 
Control 
variables 
Financial leverage Lev Debt ratio 
Equity 
concentration 
H1 Shareholding ratio of the 
largest shareholder 
Type of controlling 
shareholder 
Type Dummy variable, state-owned 
takes 1, non-state-owned takes 
0 
Commit and 
Appraisal 
Committee 
Commit Number of committees set up 
by listed companies  
Duplicate roles 
overlap 
Dual if the chairman of the listed 
company and the general 
manager are held by the same 
person, take 1; otherwise take 
0 
Independent 
Directors 
Indep Ratio of Independent 
Directors to Board of 
Directors  
Growth capability Growth Growth rate of main business 
income 
Management 
expense ratio 
Meff Management expenses / Main 
business income 
Year Year control 
Industry Industry control 
 
4.4  Research Model 
     In order to discuss the role of institutional investors in the performance 
sensitivity to management compensation, this article refers to the methods of 
Leone (2006), Firth (2006), and Lu Rui (2011), and makes appropriate 
additions based on them. 
According to Hypothesis 1, the model 1 constructed in this paper is as 
follows: 
, 1 , 2 , , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , 10 , ,
int
5
ln
i t o i t i t i t i t
i t i t i r i t i t
i t i t i t
LnPay a a Perf a Perf X All a instAll
a sizee a Lev a H a Type a Commit
a Dual a dep industry year 
   
    
     
 
 
European Scientific Journal July 2020 edition Vol.16, No.19 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
253 
Model 1 is used to test whether the overall institutional investor's 
shareholding has an impact on the performance sensitivity to the listed 
company's management compensation. This article expects that the cross-term 
coefficient α2 of the overall institutional investor's shareholding and company 
performance is significantly positive, indicating that with institutional 
shareholding ratio is constantly rising, the performance sensitivity to 
management compensation will also increase to a certain extent. 
     In order to test the impact of different types of institutional investors 
on the performance sensitivity to management compensation, this paper 
classifies institutional investors into stable institutional investors and trading 
institutions based on the stability of investment industry and time. Investors 
use this to test for differences. According to Hypothesis 2, the model 2 
constructed in this paper is as follows: 
, 1 , 2 , , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , 10 , ,
5
ln
i t o i t i t i t i t
i t i t i r i t i t
i t i t i t
LnPay a a Perf a Perf stable a stable
a sizee a Lev a H a Type a Commit
a Dual a dep industry year 
    
    
     
 
This article expects that the cross-sectional coefficient α2 of stable 
institutional investors and company performance is significantly positive. It 
indicates compared with trading institutional investors, stable institutional 
investors have a more significant role in improving the performance sensitivity 
to management compensation. 
 
5.  Empirical results 
5.1  Descriptive analyses 
The companies listed on the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-
shares from 2014 to 2018 were the research objects. After screening, there 
were a total of 8,387 samples. It can be seen from the above table: (1) the 
maximum value of the management compensation level of listed companies, 
LnPay, is 16.19, and the minimum value is 12.71. Different companies have 
different compensation levels, which may be due to the industry and 
profitability of different companies. The average salary level of managements 
is 14.31, and the median is 14.29, indicating that the salary levels of 
managements in most listed companies are lower than the average level; (2) 
Corporate performance Perf1 is measured by ROE, with a maximum value of 
0.308 and a minimum value -0.444, with an average value of 0.063. It can be 
seen that there is still a large difference in performance between different 
companies. (3) The average value of institutional investors’ shareholding in 
listed companies is 6.935%, the median is 4.37%, of which the maximum 
reaches 56.12%, while the minimum value is only 0.2%, which indicates that 
more than half of institutional investors’ shareholding ratio that is lower than 
the average level; (4) There are also large differences in the shareholding ratios 
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of different types of institutional investors, which shows that the development 
of various types of institutional investors in China is uneven; based on 
institutional investors, the average value of Stable is 0.498, and the median is 
0, indicating that the proportion of trading institutional investors in Chinese 
capital market are above 50%. Investment funds account for the majority of 
institutional investors in China. 
In terms of control variables, we can get these results by descriptive 
analyses: (1) the maximum value of the company size is 26.15, the minimum 
value is 19.92, and the average value is 22.42, and the gap between different 
company sizes is obvious; (2) the corporate debt leverage ratio is significantly 
higher, the largest value is 0.896, and the average value reaches 0.461. (3) The 
maximum sum of the squared H1 of the largest shareholder's shareholding 
ratio is 5621, the minimum value is 82.56, and the median value of 1116 is 
lower than its average value of 1474. It indicates ownership concentration is 
high; (5) The average coincidence of dual positions of the chairman and 
general manager in the sample is 0.238, and the median is 0, indicating that 
most companies have fewer overlaps of the two positions and the 
independence of the board of directors is higher; (6) The average value of 
independent director ratio Indep is 0.373, which is more than one-third, 
reflecting the requirement that the ratio of independent directors to the total 
number of directors of listed companies in China should not be less than one-
third. 
Table 2. Variable descriptive statistics 
variable  Mean  Medium  Sd  min  max  N  
Ln Pay  14.31  14.29  0.669  12.71  16.19  8387  
Perf1  0.0630  0.0640  0.100  -0.444  0.308  8387  
InstAll  6.935  4.370  9.029  0.200  56.12  8387  
Stable  0.498  0  0.500  0  1  8387  
Size  22.42  22.23  1.260  19.92  26.15  8387  
Lev  0.461  0.458  0.207  0.0670  0.896  8387  
H1  1474  1116  1203  82.56  5621  8387  
Type  0.469  0  0.499  0  1  8387  
Commit  3.937  4  0.460  2  5  8387  
Dual  0.238  0  0.453  0  1  8387  
Indep  0.373  0.333  0.0530  0.313  0.571  8387  
Growth  0.183  0.0830  0.528  -0.511  3.724  8387  
Meff  0.100  0.0800  0.0840  0.00900  0.526  8387  
 
5.2  Regression results 
     According to the model 1 constructed for H1 above, and in order to 
obtain more robust results, this paper also performs regression analysis on two 
independent variables. By summarizing and sorting, we can get the following 
results. It can be seen from the table 3, when ROE is used as corporate 
performance index for regression, the adjusted R2 of the equation is 0.294 and 
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the F value is 125.5; when we use the return on net assets and the shareholding 
ratio of the overall institutional investor for regression, the adjusted R2 is 0.291 
and 0.251. Considering the large sample size in this paper, model 1 is 
considered to have a good degree of fit and strong interpretation ability. 
The correlation coefficient between company performance measured 
by ROE and management compensation Ln Pay is 1.414, and it is significant 
at the level of 1%, indicating that corporate performance has a positive impact 
on the management compensation of listed companies. 
That institutional investors' shareholding ratio InstAll multiply 
corporate performance Perf1 is the cross-term Perf1 * InstAll. The correlation 
coefficient  of cross-term Perf1 * InstAll is 0.013, significant at the level of 
10%, indicating that the higher the overall institutional investor's shareholding 
ratio, the higher the performance sensitivity to management compensation. 
The earlier hypothesis 1 is verified. 
From the regression of the control variables, it can be seen that the 
coefficient between corporate size and management compensation Ln Pay is 
significantly positive, indicating that the larger the corporate size, the higher 
the management compensation. The control variables that are also 
significantly positive also have management Expense ratio Meff and dual roles 
of chairman and general manager, indicating that if the positions of chairman 
and general manager are held by the same person, management compensation 
will increase; financial leverage Lev, ownership concentration H1, controlling 
shareholder type Type, corporate growth Growth and management 
compensation Ln Pay are significantly negative at the level of 1%; the 
independent director's coefficient of Indep is significantly negative at the level 
of 5%, indicating that the higher the proportion of independent directors in the 
board of directors, the lower the management compensation level. The 
coefficient of the total number of committees established by the Commission 
and management compensation is -0.013, but not significant. In general, most 
of the control variables show a certain significance in the model, so it is 
considered that the control variables exert a reasonable control effect. 
The article also divides institutional investors into stable and trading 
types based on stability. The following table 4 shows the relationship between 
the stability of institutional investors and the performance sensitivity to 
management compensation. As it can be seen from the table 4, the cross term 
perf1 * Stable of the company's performance Perf1 and the stability of 
institutional investors Stable is significant at the level of 1%, with a coefficient 
of 0.62 ＞ 0. When Stable = 1, for stable institutional investors, the positive 
impact of corporate performance Pref1 on management compensation Ln Pay 
is higher than trading investors when Stable = 0. Thus, the regression results 
support Hypothesis 2.In terms of control variables, except that the coefficient 
of the compensation committee is not significant, other control variables are 
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significantly related to management compensation to varying degrees. 
Table 3. Regression results of the stability of institutional investors on sensitivity to 
management pay performance 
VARIABLES  Ln Pay  Ln Pay  Ln Pay  
Constant  
 
Perf1 
 
InstAll 
 
Perf1*InstAll 
 
Size 
 
Lev 
 
H1 
 
Type 
 
Commit 
 
Dual 
 
Indep 
 
Growth 
 
Meff 
8.318*** 
( 51.09) 
1.518*** 
(22.80) 
 
 
 
 
0.280*** 
(42.56) 
-0.246*** 
(-6.46) 
-0.000*** 
(-5.08) 
-0.085*** 
(-5.97) 
-0.016 
(-1.21) 
0.041*** 
(2.89) 
-0.281** 
(-2.39) 
-0.057*** 
(-4.76) 
0.545*** 
(6.42) 
8.093***  
(48.45) 
 
 
0.005*** 
(6.64) 
 
 
0.299*** 
(44.55) 
-0.442*** 
(-11.62) 
-0.000*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.122*** 
(-8.34) 
-0.011 
(-0.79) 
0.043*** 
(3.00) 
-0.349*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.016 
(-1.28) 
0.257*** 
(2.97) 
 
8.340***  
(51.29) 
1.414*** 
(17.85) 
0.003*** 
(3.09) 
0.013* 
(1.83) 
0.278*** 
(42.07) 
-0.245*** 
(-6.44) 
-0.000*** 
(-4.90) 
-0.091*** 
(-6.42) 
-0.013 
(-0.99) 
0.041*** 
(2.90) 
-0.257** 
(-2.19) 
-0.057*** 
(-4.77) 
0.529*** 
(6.22) 
 
Ind  control  control control 
Year  control control control 
Observations  8,387  8,387  8,387  
R-squared  0.294  0.254  0.296  
r2_a  0.291  0.251  0.294  
F  133.6  109.2  125.5  
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
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Table 3. Regression results of the stability of institutional investors on sensitivity to 
management compensation performance 
                (1)             (2)      (3)  
Constant  
 
Perf1 
 
Stable 
 
Perf1*Stable 
8.191***  
(49.51) 
 
 
0.044*** 
(3.20) 
8.340***  
(51.29) 
1.414*** 
(17.85) 
8.375***  
(51.50) 
1.220*** 
(13.69) 
-0.016 
(-0.99) 
0.620*** 
(4.50) 
Size  
 
0.292***  
(43.63) 
0.278***  
(42.07) 
0.276***  
(41.79) 
Lev  -0.383***  
(-10.11) 
-0.245***  
(-6.44) 
-0.240***  
(-6.33) 
H1  -0.000***  
(-3.97) 
-0.000***  
(-4.90) 
-0.000***  
(-4.92) 
Type  -0.112***  
(-7.76) 
-0.091***  
(-6.42) 
-0.090***  
(-6.36) 
Commit  -0.012  
(-0.85) 
-0.013  
(-0.99) 
-0.012  
(-0.88) 
Dual  0.042***  
(2.91) 
0.041***  
(2.90) 
0.041***  
(2.90) 
Indep  -0.334***  
(-2.80) 
-0.257**  
(-2.19) 
-0.265**  
(-2.26) 
Growth  -0.026**  
(-2.15) 
-0.057***  
(-4.77) 
-0.056***  
(-4.67) 
Meff  0.336***  
(3.91) 
0.529***  
(6.22) 
0.533***  
(6.28) 
Ind  control  control control 
Year  control control control 
Observations  8,387  8,387  8,387  
R-squared  0.270  0.296  0.298  
r2_a  0.268  0.294  0.296  
F  110.5  125.5  118.3  
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
 
5.3  Analysis of robustness results 
     In order to ensure the conservatism of the research results, this paper 
also performs a robustness test on the basis of regression. The method adopted 
is the variable substitution method. This paper chooses the return on total 
assets Perf2 instead of the return on assets Perf1 as the explanatory variable. 
The ROA index shows corporate income, corporate competitiveness and its 
future development prospects. Regression was then performed on the relevant 
variables. The results of the robustness test are basically in line with 
expectations. Therefore, the conclusion of this article is reliable. 
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Conclusion 
Based on the analysis of domestic and foreign literature and related 
theories, this paper proposes two hypotheses. The data of A-share listed 
companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2014 to 2018 is 
selected for analysis. The sample data was subjected to descriptive statistics 
and correlation analysis. Then, from the three aspects of the institutional 
investor's overall shareholding ratio, organizational form, and stability, 
regression analysis was performed to examine their impact on performance 
sensitivity to management compensation. 
1. There is a significantly positive correlation between the overall 
shareholding ratio institutional investors and performance sensitivity 
to management performance. As the influence scope of Chinese 
institutional investors has gradually expanded, their shareholding ratio 
has also gradually increased. Because institutional investors have 
advantages that individual investors cannot match in terms of funds 
and professions, they can play a more effective role in governance and 
supervision. 
2. Compared with trading institutional investors, stable institutional 
investors can better promote performance sensitivity to management 
compensation, that is, the more stable the institutional investor, the 
more performance sensitive to management compensation can be. The 
reason for the above conclusion is that stable institutional investors 
have more motivating factors to encourage them to actively participate 
in corporate governance, monitor management in real time, and then 
pay attention to whether management compensation matches corporate 
performance. As for trading institutional investors, their shareholding 
ratio is low and fluctuates frequently, and they lack the motivation to 
actively participate in corporate governance. Therefore, their impact 
on performance sensitivity to management compensation is not as 
significant as that of stable institutional investors. 
 
According to the theoretical and empirical analysis of this paper, we 
can see that institutional investors play a good role in corporate governance, 
promote the rationalization of management compensation mechanism, and 
thus improve the performance sensitivity to management compensation. In 
order to better promote institutional investors to play effective corporate 
governance role, this article proposes the following suggestions: 
1. Develop an effective management compensation incentive mechanism 
to reasonably match corporate performance and compensation levels. 
According to the incentive theory extended by the principal-agent 
theory, in order to maximize the interests of shareholders, it is 
necessary to design a scientific compensation incentive policy to 
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promote the convergence of the ultimate benefits of management and 
shareholders, so as to promote management's enthusiasm for work and 
bring more rewards. Therefore, in order to make the incentive system 
work better, senior managers or corporate shareholders should take 
risky compensation into consideration when designing the 
remuneration system. Since the compensation of senior management 
and corporate performance have a stronger positive correlation, 
currency and equity incentives take the combination of short-term and 
long-term incentives. So that appropriately increase the proportion of 
long-term equity incentives in the compensation system according to 
the actual situation can improve the loyalty of managers and help 
companies achieve their goals. 
2. Vigorously cultivate stable institutional investors and encourage them 
to actively participate in corporate governance. It can be seen from the 
final conclusion of the article that the more stable the institutional 
investors, the more conducive to the performance sensitivity to 
corporate management compensation. Stable institutional holdings can 
actively participate in corporate governance, exercise strong 
supervision of management, and affect the matching of management 
compensation mechanisms with corporate performance, thereby 
promoting the goal convergence between managements and corporate 
shareholders. Therefore, more efforts must be made to support the 
development of stable institutional investors so that they can better 
play the role of facilitator in capital market. 
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